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Abstract Our study applies empirical scrutiny to the network effects of a leading
European online dating platform. While one might expect equal gender represen-
tation on such a platform to yield the best user experience and the highest revenue
per user, our analysis shows that the platform requires only 36.2 % of its user base
to be female to maximize revenue, primarily because women exert stronger positive
cross-side network effects on men than vice versa; this optimum results in 17.2 %
higher sales than a 50/50 split. Intermediaries of two-sided markets can use our
model to improve user acquisition strategies.
Keywords Network effects  Two-sided markets  Online dating 
Willingness to pay  Revenue optimization
1 Introduction
In two-sided markets, an intermediary provides a platform enabling two different
user groups to interact, for instance to make a transaction to satisfy their
interdependent demands (Bakos and Katsamakas 2008; Ellison and Ellison 2005;
Roch1et and Tirole 2003, 2006). Some two-sided online markets have expanded at a
furious pace in recent years (Tucker and Zhang 2010). eBay, for example, brings
together sellers and prospective buyers of different kinds of goods, Google
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(Berger and Gleisner 2009). Eisenmann et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive list of
examples for online and offline two-sided markets. Often, a neutral third party
manages the platform (Yoo et al. 2002, 2007) with the commercial objective to
maximize its own profits by optimally monetizing one or both user groups.
Previous research on two-sided markets indicates that the two user groups exhibit
different kinds of network effects (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis
1994). Users may derive positive cross-side network effects (CNEs) from the
participation of members on the other side of the market, which means the larger the
installed user base on one side of the platform, the more attractive the service for the
opposite side’s users (Armstrong 2006; Li et al. 2010; Tucker and Zhang 2010).
Network effects can also emerge within one user group, known as same-side
network effects (SNEs). For example, a new eBay seller can have a negative effect
on other sellers because he or she increases competition between sellers and may
snatch away potential buyers (Kraemer et al. 2012; Li et al. 2010).
Utilizing positive network effects and mitigating negative ones is an important
challenge for providers of two-sided markets. In recent years, the number of
scientific studies which empirically assess such effects has been rapidly increasing
(Chu and Manchanda 2013). Yoo et al. (2002) highlight the importance of
identifying the magnitude of the network effects for both user groups, and state that
it is difficult to estimate these effects. Knowledge of the direction and the magnitude
of network effects can be used to support customer acquisition, pricing,
monetization, and IT investment strategies for two-sided markets (Bakos and
Katsamakas 2008; Kraemer et al. 2012; Sridhar et al. 2011).
Our empirical study examines a leading European online dating platform.
Although online dating is one of the example industries in the literature on two-
sided markets and seems theoretically very promising for identifying network
effects (Armstrong 2006; Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Ellison and Ellison 2005;
Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2006), this paper is the first to examine this industry
empirically. In our case, the two user groups are heterosexual men and women. The
platform enables them to search for each other, to communicate and to initiate real-
life dates.
For an intermediary of a two-sided market, it is of interest to know how much
future revenue and/or profit can be expected from a given user group; this datum
informs effective and efficient use of limited budgets (Malthouse and Blattberg
2005; Borle et al. 2008). Prior to our research, between 35 and 41 % of the users on
the platform in question were women, and the intermediary aimed to reach a 50/50
split in the near future. Naturally, one might think that equal numbers of men and
women on such a platform yield the best user experience (then, every woman
matches with a man) and thus the highest revenue per user for the platform
intermediary. However, this does not take into consideration the differences in the
user groups’ willingness to pay and how CNEs and SNEs impact user behavior.
Our research aims to determine the direction and the magnitude of the different
kinds of network effects on the platform and their impact on revenue, both in
aggregate and of each user group individually. In addition to this empirical
validation of existing theory, we propose an approach to determine the revenue-
optimal ratio of men to women on the platform in light of the various existing
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network effects. We show that the online dating platform in question can
significantly increase its revenue with the proper balance of male and female users.
2 Network effects in two-sided markets
2.1 Previous research
Katz and Shapiro (1985) state that for many technologies, users may benefit from a
growing user base. Services such as the telephone, e-mail and social networks
exhibit positive network effects. These occur if two or more individuals are able to
interact within this network, changing their utility of the network.
Two-sided markets have two different user groups. The intermediary provides a
platform for the interaction between these groups (Berger and Gleisner 2009;
Kraemer et al. 2012; Yoo et al. 2002, 2007). Usually, a user interacts only with
participants from the other user group. For example, a retailer aims to sell his or her
products on eBay to a certain consumer (not to another retailer), and a heterosexual
man looks only for a potential female partner on Match.com.
Such two-sided markets possess network effects across user groups (CNEs) and
within a single user group (SNEs). CNEs exist if the number of users on one market
side influences the utility of the opposite group’s users. On eBay, for example, an
increased number of sellers improves the product selection and makes the platform
more attractive to buyers. Similarly, having more buyers increases sellers’ chance of
successfully selling their items, thereby making the platform more attractive to
them. SNEs exist if a user’s utility is affected by the installed user base of his or her
own user group (Armstrong 2006; Eisenmann et al. 2006). For example, more eBay
sellers competing for a given number of potential buyers reduce each other’s
chances of transacting with a buyer. Depending on the investigated market, SNEs
can possess either a negative effect (Dai and Kauffman 2006; Villanueva et al.
2008; Yoo et al. 2002, 2007) or a positive one (Bakos and Katsamakas 2008;
Eisenmann et al. 2006) on users’ utility.
To date, the literature on two-sided online markets has concentrated mainly on
two research paths. The first path focuses on pricing considerations that are specific
to two-sided markets experiencing network effects and examines which price
structure to apply at which price level, and which user group to charge for using the
services provided (Armstrong 2006; Chao and Derdenger 2013; Eisenmann et al.
2006; Jullien 2005; Parker and Van Alstyne 2005; Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2006;
Rysman 2009). In the case of eBay, the platform may charge sellers, buyers, or both
user groups for using the platform.
The second research path investigates the effectiveness of the intermediary’s
investment decisions and is more closely related to our work. Bakos and
Katsamakas (2008) analyze design choices and investments such as the quality of
technology, the services offered to each side, and the rules of interaction between
the two user groups that create network effects in two-sided markets. Yoo et al.
(2002) offer different strategies to optimize the intermediary’s revenue, depending
on the ownership model of the platform. Kraemer et al. (2012) find asymmetric
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network effects on an eBay-like platform and assess the effectiveness of various IT
and design investment features in increasing the platform value. Tucker and Zhang
(2010) examine the impact of advertising the size of the user base on further
participation of buyers and sellers in two-sided markets.
While these studies aim to find the intermediary’s optimal strategy (e.g., in terms
of revenue or platform value) to invest in IT improvements, quality, or marketing
strategies, our paper searches for the revenue-optimal split between the two user
groups, after empirically proving all corresponding directions of network effects,
considering fixed user fees. In spite of substantial theoretical and methodological
work on network effects, Wilbur (2008) as well as Kraemer et al. (2012) states that
empirical analyses are still scarce due to a lack of real-life data to properly identify
the effects within and across the user groups. Table 1 summarizes the results of
these empirical studies and highlights the research gap and the contribution of our
paper.
Our paper is related to the studies shown in Table 1, but with some notable
differences. Chu and Manchanda (2013) state that previous work often focused on
the benefits (or costs) a user obtains from additional users from either the same or
the opposite user group, but not simultaneously from both sides. As a consequence,
many studies thoroughly quantify CNEs, yet do not consider SNEs (e.g.,
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996) or use lagged sales as a proxy for SNEs (Sridhar
et al. 2011). The few existing studies that investigate both direct CNEs and SNEs
use their results to model individual behavior (Tucker and Zhang 2010) or network
value (Asvanund et al. 2004), while our study examines the direct impact of network
effects on the intermediary’s revenue, number of users and subscribers. We also
notice that most studies employ data on a market level, while our study—as few
others—uses a unique transactional data provided by a company. In addition, our
work is the first empirical paper that studies network effects in the online dating
industry.
2.2 Expected network effects on an online dating platform
2.2.1 Online dating
Three parties are involved in such a market, namely the intermediary that provides
the platform and the two user groups, women and men, looking for potential
partners. For reasons of simplicity (see likewise Armstrong 2006), we focus our
analysis on participants looking for users of the opposite gender. Men searching for
men and women searching for women are both homogeneous user groups without
interaction with other user groups, and thus form a one-sided market, which is not
part of our study.
Users of a dating platform clearly belong to one market side. When registering, a
new user provides information on his/her gender and whether he/she is interested in
meeting men or women. After this, the user typically does not change his/her role.
In contrast, an eBay user can both sell and buy items at the same time, which makes
it more difficult to identify the occurring network effects.
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Most online dating platforms possess a ‘freemium’ pricing model. On platforms
with this model, new users can create a profile for free, browse through the profiles
of other users, see who visited their own profile, and send preset short messages
known as ‘winks’ (such as ‘‘your picture looks nice’’) to other users. However, only
paying users, purchasing a subscription, can start full-text conversations with others
and reply to winks. This means that at least one person (man or woman) needs to be
a paying user to initiate the contact and possibly a ‘first date’ later on. A look at
(each) the 100 top-grossing dating and social networking apps for iPhone
(AppAnnie 2015) in the US, Japan and Germany shows that 30 out of 34 of such
apps (i.e., 88 %) follow such a freemium strategy.
Kinsey et al. (1948) describe that the traditional gender role expects men to
initiate contacts and women to respond. In real-life dating, women usually receive
more offers from men than vice versa (Gutek et al. 1990). In addition, (Fisman et al.
2006) report from a speed dating experiment that men respond more strongly to
their counterparts’ physical attractiveness. If this holds true for online dating, one
can expect men’s willingness to subscribe to the paid service to be stronger than
those of women.
2.2.2 CNEs
The main purpose of using an online dating platform is to look for, find, and contact
potential partners of the opposite gender. Hence, users of one user group (e.g., men)
care especially about the number of users on the other side (in this case: women)
(Armstrong 2006; McIntyre and Subramaniam 2009; Tucker and Zhang 2010).
Two-sided markets yield effects in which users in one group choose a good that
affects another group’s choice of a different good (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005).
For example, a woman joining the dating platform may motivate men to contact her.
Thus, the utility of the platform to a paying male (female) user increases when he
(she) can communicate with more women (men) (Yoo et al. 2002), which means
that paying users on both market sides enjoy positive network effects from the
installed user base on the opposite market side. This network effect can reflect the
increased probability of finding a satisfactory match among the other side’s users
(Bakos and Katsamakas 2008). Keeping the number of men constant, more women
offer men a wider variety of matches (Ellison and Ellison 2005; Gehrig 1998), a
greater chance of finding a unique fitting match (Caillaud and Jullien 2003), and
reduce the competition between men for a specific woman (Dai and Kauffman 2006;
Wang and Seidmann 1995; Yoo et al. 2002).
Previous research has shown that positive network effects leading to increased
user enjoyment of the underlying service also have a positive impact on customers’
willingness to pay (e.g., Borgatti et al. 2009; Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996;
Farrell and Saloner 1985; Katz and Shapiro 1985). Eisenmann et al. (2006) as well
as Ellison and Ellison (2005) show that both user groups in two-sided markets are
willing to pay more for access to a bigger network.
CNEs can also positively influence user acquisition (Villanueva et al. 2008) and
retention (Chen and Xie 2007; Nitzan and Libai 2011). Single men or women are
more likely to join a platform that possesses a large number of relevant users than
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one that does not (Li et al. 2010). The impact of CNEs on retention or churn,
however, are not trivial in the given freemium context: On the one hand, a smaller
number of users of the opposite gender makes a dating service less attractive
because the chances of finding a partner are lower. Thus, many users would be
frustrated and may sign off earlier. On the other hand, a smaller number of users of
the opposite gender may hinder people from signing up to the service (if they know
in advance) or aggravate existing users’ search for a fitting match, which may then
lead to a longer usage lifetime for both sides.
2.2.3 SNEs
While CNEs are usually positive (but not always, as Sridhar et al. 2011 show), SNEs
can be commonly found both ways in two-sided markets. For example, positive
effects on each user’s network utility can be found if game console owners
appreciate co-playing and trading games with friends who possess the same console
(Eisenmann et al. 2006), or if the platform users create a community that can
provide support, collaborate, and share information with other users (Bakos and
Katsamakas 2008). However, in most cases, SNEs have a negative effect on users’
utility, especially in markets where users prefer fewer rivals (e.g., sellers on eBay
competing for the same buyers) (Dai and Kauffman 2006; Li et al. 2010; Tucker and
Zhang 2010; Wang and Seidmann 1995). Following the aforementioned idea that
the utility of the online dating platform to a specific user increases when he/she can
contact more users of the opposite gender, the utility of the service should decrease
when there are more users of the same gender (i.e., rivals) competing for the users of
the other group.
At any point in time, men and women on the platform can use the search function
to check the number of users of each gender. Here, the number of users of the
opposite gender is more relevant as users are looking for a partner, not a rival. Still,
men/women have to option to search the platform for users of their own gender. In
practice, however, they often estimate the number of rivals and the chance to find a
match based on ‘weak signals’ such as the number of profile visits they receive from
interested users of the opposite gender (Bapna et al. 2012) or the share of received
messages or winks. Having too many rivals may eventually lead to fewer
registrations from that user group, faster churn, and/or fewer subscriptions to the
charged service. It will be interesting to see if we find substantive negative SNEs at
all in our empirical study and how they differ between men and women.
3 Theoretical validation: identifying direction and magnitude
of network effects
3.1 Platform and data description
In this section, we aim to empirically examine the existence and measure the
magnitude of various network effects. To do so, we use customer and payment data
from a leading European online dating platform that has been operational for
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approximately 10 years. Users can register and create a profile for free. Every user
must provide a nickname, his/her gender, place of residence and whether he or she
would like to meet men or women. In addition, users can share profile pictures, age,
hobbies and other personal details. All users can actively search and browse through
the profiles of other (male or female) users in their vicinity. As mentioned above, we
focus on the cases of men searching for women and vice versa.
The online dating platform applies the industry-typical freemium model
described in Sect. 2.2: signing up and searching for other users is free of charge;
however, users have to subscribe to one of the two available premium packages to
be able to initiate conversations with other users. The premium packages, which we
refer to as ‘Silver’ and ‘Gold’, can be purchased through a monthly subscription and
can be renewed at any time. The monthly prices lie between €20 and €60 per month,
depending on the length of the subscription (1–12 months; longer term packages
incur a lower monthly price) and the chosen package (Gold is more expensive than
Silver). The subscription prices were not changed during the entire investigated
timeframe and are the same for both women and men. The Silver package allows
subscribers to send messages, initiate chats and see which members are interested in
their profile. The Gold package additionally highlights its subscribers in the search
results and recommends users of the opposite gender in the same city with similar
interests and hobbies.
Our data set covers two and a half years, from July 1st, 2010 to December 31st,
2012 (i.e., 915 consecutive days). We examine the data from one sample city of
approximately 100,000 inhabitants. A total of 8923 users registered within our
sample period, of which 40.8 % were women.
The analyzed payment data covers all transactions (i.e., subscriptions to a
premium package) including the start and end date of the subscription, the product
type (Silver or Gold), and the price. All incomplete transactions, such as fraud,
chargebacks, and free upgrades (‘‘try our Gold membership for free for 1 month!’’)
are excluded from the sample. The dating platform generated a total revenue of
approximately €90,000 from paying users. The majority (89.3 %) of the revenue is
produced by male users. Not only do men spend more money on the platform, they
are also more loyal to it. The median lifetime (i.e., interval between registration and
sign-off) is 102 days for a male user and 75 days for a female user. Table 2 provides
a data summary and Table 3 shows the key figures on a daily basis. In addition, we
show in Table 4 that Gold customers have significantly higher daily and total
revenue compared to Silver users.
Table 2 Descriptive data
Number of registrations Median user lifetime in days Revenue share
Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men
3640 5283 8923 75 102 86 10.7 % 89.3 %
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3.2 Model and variables
Kraemer et al. (2012) summarize that network effects in two-sided markets can be
measured in several ways. Among them are choice models (e.g., Pavlou 2002;
Rysman 2009; Stock and Yogo 2005), diffusion models (e.g., Gandal et al. 2000;
Gupta et al. 2009; Chu and Manchanda 2013), vector autoregressions (e.g., Chen
et al. 2001) and linear regressions (e.g., Hendel et al. 2007; Seamans and Zhu 2013).
To account for the specifications of both user groups, we estimate simultaneous
equation models (SURE; seemingly unrelated regression equations), as used by
Mantrala et al. (2007) and Sridhar et al. (2011). To address the challenges that
outliers pose for some statistical models, we use the Huber–White sandwich
estimators (Huber 1967; White 1980) in all our models, thereby obviating minor
concerns about the potential failure to meet assumptions, such as normality,
heteroskedasticity, or observations that exhibit large residuals, leverage, or
influence.
Table 3 Descriptive data on a daily basis, N = 915 days
Min. Max. Mean Median SD
Installed user base 1365 1924 1536.7 1505 133.0
Number of new registrations 1 22 7.38 7 3.61
Share of paying users in % 3.74 7.71 6.21 6.37 0.92
Share of women in % 35.5 41.1 38.4 38.3 1.1
User age (upon registration) in years 18 99 37.1 35 11.3
Lifetime (of the platform) in days 3835 4749 4292 4292 264.3
Table 4 Silver versus Gold subscriptions: comparison of duration and revenue
Silver customers Gold customers P value (t test)
No. of subscriptions 595 41 –
Revenue per day
Average €1.07 €2.06 0.003
Median €0.98 €1.31
SD €0.98 €4.01
Subscription length in days
Average 165 160 0.886
Median 93 152
SD 214.9 132.8
Total revenue per subscription
Average €133.95 €204.26 0.000
Median €89.70 €199.26
SD €147.34 €156.57
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3.2.1 Dependent variables
For the purposes of our study, we consider revenue maximization on a per-user level
and in total to be the primary economic variable, and aim to assess to what extent
network effects (both CNEs and SNEs) describe the investigated platform’s total
revenue within a given timeframe. We break down the activity and revenue data on
a daily basis. When a user subscribes to a premium package, we split the relevant
revenue evenly over the entire subscription period. An example: a free user
subscribes to a premium package from January 1st, 2012 to March 31st, 2012 (i.e.,
90 days) for a total of €180, and returns to using the service for free afterwards. In
our data set, he/she shows daily revenue of €2 in these 3 months, and daily revenue
of zero before and after. Using this approach, revenue can be stated (for any day) as
the product of the average revenue per user and the installed base (per-user group).
In our regression models, we will consecutively check for network effects, first
describing the daily revenue per user (DailyRevenuePerWoman/Man), second the
net user gains (NetGainWomen/Men, i.e., variation of the installed base compared to
the previous day), and finally the total revenue (DailyRevenueAllWomen/AllMen/
AllUsers).
3.2.2 Independent variables
Most research models (e.g., Armstrong 2006; Bakos and Katsamakas 2008;
Fudenberg and Tirole 2000; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Pang and Etzion 2012; Yoo
et al. 2002) consider network effects to be linear in the size of the relevant user base.
For our models in Sect. 3.3, we also employ a linear specification of network
effects, counting the number of active Men and Women as the relevant user bases.
Later, in Sect. 4, we use a modified model to ascertain the optimal user split
between men and women.
According to the intermediary, most dating customers register in the evening and
need some time setting up their profile and uploading appropriate profile pictures.
We therefore assume that they start affecting other users with a time lag of 1 day
(see likewise Chu and Manchanda 2013); Men and Women are therefore the number
of users at the end of the previous day. In addition, we consider several control
variables such as the platform lifetime in days as well as dummy variables for
extraordinary TV events, seasonality, and major updates to the game. These dummy
variables are set at 1 if applicable to a certain case, and 0 if not. For example,
Update2 went live on day 4088; all cases prior to the update have been labeled with
0 and with 1 as of that day. During the sample period of two and a half years, the
platform underwent ten permanent game updates such as design changes and the
introduction of new features. Table 5 describes the independent variables used in
our model.
3.3 Identification of CNEs and SNEs
Our first analysis investigates how network effects describe the average daily
revenue per user. The employed SURE model treats the average
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DailyRevenuePerWoman and DailyRevenuePerMan (both in eurocent) as dependent
variables. We estimate several models to ensure the robustness of our results. We
begin considering only the number of users of the same gender as independent
variables (SNEs; model 1) and successively include additional parameters: the
number of users of the opposite gender (CNEs; model 2), platform parameters
(model 3), and eventually seasonal parameters (complete model 4). Table 6
summarizes the results. We detect no change of algebraic signs for the significant
variables from one model to another and thus conclude that our findings are robust.
We emphasize that these results are only of descriptive nature and we can only
assume causality due to the strong theoretical background available in the domain of
network effects.
As we expected, we see that male users generate a much higher basic daily
revenue (constant is 17.03, p\ 0.01) compared to female users (8.35, p\ 0.01).
Without considering any network effects, adding more men to the platform would
therefore be much more remunerative than adding additional women. However, our
model also finds support for negative SNEs on both sides: we can see that the
installed base of female users Women is negatively correlated (p\ 0.01) with
DailyRevenuePerWoman, as Men is with DailyRevenuePerMan. We can also find
positive correlations between Men and DailyRevenuePerWoman as well as between
Women and DailyRevenuePerMan. Both are highly significant (p\ 0.01) and
Table 5 Description of the independent variables
Covariate Description Min Max Median SD
Women Installed base of female users on the previous day 506 782 572 63.3
Men Installed base of male users on the previous day 832 1144 931 73.1
PlatformLifetime Lifetime of the platform since launch (in days) 3835 4749 4292 264.3
Update1 Bug fixes, selected inactive users deleted 0 1 1 0.34
Update2 Payment website update 0 1 1 0.45
Update3 New payment website 0 1 1 0.49
Update4 Introduction of new flirt game (1) 0 1 1 0.50
Update5 New registration process 0 1 0 0.48
Update6 Introduction of monthly billing (step 1) 0 1 0 0.46
Update7 Introduction of monthly billing (step 2) 0 1 0 0.43
Update8 New Internet law implemented for payment
website
0 1 0 0.37
Update9 Monthly billing complete 0 1 0 0.37
Update10 Introduction of new flirt game (2) 0 1 0 0.11
TVevent1 UEFA EURO 2010 0 1 0 0.11
TVevent2 FIFA World Cup 2012 0 1 0 0.16
Winter Season 0 1 0 0.41
Spring Season 0 1 0 0.40
Summer Season 0 1 0 0.46
Fall Season (Omitted because of
collinearity)
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support positive CNEs. Looking at the magnitude of the network effects, we see that
the positive CNEs that women exert on men are stronger than vice versa (0.00664
vs. 0.00274). Moreover, the negative SNEs effected by women are weaker than
those by men (-0.00495 vs. -0.00831). While such positive CNEs could be
expected, it is interesting to see that we find significant negative SNEs in both cases.
Users—and primarily men—are indeed affected by stronger competition, which
leads to reduced user expenditures on the focal service.
Next, we estimate a SURE model with NetGainWomen and NetGainMen as
dependent variables. For each day, NetGainWomen/Men describes the change of the
installed user base (per-user group) compared to the previous day (i.e., new
registrations minus churners). Table 7 shows the results.
While we cannot find any significant CNEs (in the final model), we observe
significant negative SNEs on both user sides. The more women (men) on the
platform, the higher the number of churning women (men). We interpret this result
as a competition effect that strengthens the negative SNEs we have seen regarding
DailyRevenuePerUser: in case of strong competition, users do not only tend to stay
free users, but they are also more likely to leave the platform. We do not observe
positive reputation or popularity effects (i.e., the site growing faster as prospective
customers learn that more people are using it; see Table 8 for a respective analysis).
These results are especially interesting as they indicate that each user group has a
reasonable maximum size. With additional users, it becomes increasingly hard (and
probably expensive) for the intermediary to acquire and keep users of a certain
gender. At such a point, it may become more effective to acquire new users of the
opposite user group (which brings us to the determination of the optimal split
between men and women in Sect. 4.2).
We will now examine the impact on total daily revenue that additional Women
and Men have. Table 9 displays the results of this analysis. Consistent to our
previous analyses, we employ a SURE model to estimate DailyRevenueAllWomen
and DailyRevenueAllMen, while we apply a separate OLS regression model to
estimate DailyRevenueAllUsers.
We can see that additional women always generate additional revenue. Despite
the negative SNEs leading to lower daily revenue per woman (Table 6), higher
churn of female users (Table 7) and lower total revenue from women (Table 9),
more women still have a positive revenue effect because of the positive CNEs they
exert. While one additional female user reduces the daily DailyRevenueAllWomen
by €0.21, it has a positive effect on the daily DailyRevenueAllMen of €0.69, which
eventually increases DailyRevenueAllUsers by €0.48 per day. We see that a user’s
basic willingness to pay including positive CNEs overcompensates here the
negative SNEs.
On the other side, despite being the main payers (independent of network
effects), increasing the number of men does not always mean additional revenue.
While we can find significant positive CNEs on DailyRevenueAllWomen, the effect
of purely adding male users to DailyRevenueAllMen and DailyRevenueAllUsers is
insignificant, mostly because of the aforementioned negative SNEs. Knowing of the
existence of these effects, we aim to find to revenue-optimal split of men and
women in the next section.
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4 Practical application: determining the revenue-optimal share of men
and women
4.1 Motivation and numeric example
Most two-sided markets are managed with the objective of maximizing profit
generation via the paying installed user base (Yoo et al. 2002, 2007). Due to
budgetary constraints, intermediaries are only able to acquire and serve a finite
number of users. Such intermediaries may fail to maximize their revenue if they do
not consider the network effects present on their platform. To demonstrate how such
circumstances can lead to mismanagement of the platform, we will now examine a
numerical example using the results from our previous analyses.
In Sect. 3.3, we found that male users spend more money on average than female
users, but female users carry an additional indirect revenue potential because the
positive CNEs they exert on revenue generated per male user are stronger than vice
versa. In addition, the existing negative SNEs are stronger for men than for women.
We apply these results to the simplified numerical example in Table 10.
For our example, we assume the network provider possesses a budget to acquire
100 users of any gender and is looking for the split between men m and women
w yielding the highest overall revenue. Total revenue equals the sum of the revenue
generated by both men and women:
Revm;w ¼ m probmfeem þ w probwfeew with mþ w ¼ 100: ð1Þ
In this stylized two-sided market, men are more likely to become paying users
than women (probm = 6 vs. probw = 2 %). In both groups, paying users pay the
same average fee (feem = feew = €100). This means an average man generates
revenue of 6 %  €100 = €6, while a woman generates on average only 2 % 
€100 = €2. An intermediary who does not consider network effects would thus
conclude that they should only acquire men as users and not a single woman.
This strategy, however, seems clearly questionable as a dating platform without
women offers men no reason to become paying users on. We will now consider the
impact of CNEs and SNEs upon the basic purchase likelihood. As shown in the
following quadratic equation, each user’s expected revenue is influenced by positive
CNEs from all users of the opposite gender and negative SNEs from all other users
of the same gender.
Table 10 User characteristics in a fictitious two-sided dating market




Probm/probw Basic probability to become a paying user 6 % 2 %
Feem/feew Avg. fee per paying user €100 €100
CNEm/CNEw Positive CNEs on other user group’s revenue per
user
€0.02 €0.06
SNEm/SNEw Negative SNEs on same user group’s revenue per
user
-€0.015 -€0.01
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Revm;w ¼ m  ðprobmfeem þ CNEwwþ SNEm  ðm  1ÞÞ þ w  ðprobwfeew
þ CNEmmþ SNEw  ðw  1ÞÞ with m þ w
¼ 100: ð2Þ
Differentiating the revenue formula (2) with respect to m and setting the derivate
to zero allows to determine the revenue-optimal split of male and female users (we
expand this process in Sect. 4.2). Figure 1 shows the total revenue in our example of
all male and female users combined when considering user split-dependent network
effects. Changing the share of women (i.e., the horizontal axis in Fig. 1) shows two
effects: First, as men generally have a higher probability for becoming paying users,
the revenue stemming from this basic likelihood is highest with more men, even in
light of the negative revenue impact of SNEs. Second, an elevated proportion of
female users exerts CNEs, which have the highest positive revenue impact at 50 %
of the user base. The CNE-induced revenue curve follows an inverted U-shaped
form, and the revenue surplus is incrementally reduced with a lower/higher share of
women. Taken together, these effects lead to a revenue optimum at circa 67 % men
and 33 % women. Given the same total number of users, the intermediary’s revenue
are 5.4 % higher than in a 50/50 user split (€567.99 vs. €538.75).
This simple example demonstrates that intermediaries with knowledge of
network effects can make better business decisions, for example by identifying and
profitably acquiring those customers who promise the highest revenue contribution
to the network; such an identification enables the intermediary to optimize the user
split on their platform.
4.2 User split optimization for the investigated platform
We will now use authentic data to empirically determine the optimal ratio of male to
female users with regard to the highest possible revenue generation. Our approach is
usable for platform intermediaries in two-sided markets that aim at an effective use
of their limited user acquisition budgets.
In this section, we use the same data set as in Sect. 3 with slightly adjusted

















20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Share of women
Basic revenue and SNEs
CNEs
Revenue stemming from positive CNEs
Revenue stemming from basic likelihood
to become a paying user and SNEs
Revenue-optimal share of 
women: 33% (€567.99)
Fig. 1 Revenue-optimal share of women in the numerical example
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dependent variable (i.e., DailyRevenueAllUsers/Users) to ascertain the proportion of
women that yields the best results. We also replace the previously used absolute
user numbers Men and Women with a dependent variable which represents the
proportion of female users, both in linear and quadratic form (ShareOfWomen and
ShareOfWomenSquared, each as a percentage of total users). All other variables
remain the same as those in Table 6. Table 11 shows the results of the employed
regression model.
Table 11 shows positive linear and negative quadratic influence of the proportion
of female users on total revenue per user, which yields a single point of female-
Table 11 Results from OLS regression
Independent variables Dependent variable: DailyRevenuePerUser
Model 1 Model 2 Final model 3
User split
ShareOfWomen 334.2746*** 312.4332*** 346.8351***



















Constant -56.39442*** -58.46802*** -65.29321***
F 162.70 347.90 258.91
Number of observations 1005,275 1005,275 1005,275
R2 0.0002 0.0034 0.0035
Optimum (highest revenue dep. on share of women) 35.7 % 36.5 % 36.2 %
Dependent variable: DailyRevenuePerUser (in eurocent)
* Significant at the 10 % level
** Significant at the 5 % level
*** Significant at the 1 % level
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dependent maximized revenue. The regression formula (3) slightly differs from the
equation used in the numeric example (2) as we are not restricted to a total of 100
users and have different variables compared to the previously used, simplified
model. Differentiating the abridged regression formula (3) shown below with
respect to ShareOfWomen and setting the derivate to zero (4) yields a critical point
at a proportion of female users of 36.2 % (5). As we can easily see from Eq. (4), the
function’s second derivative is negative and the identified point is therefore a local
maximum in terms of revenue: the desired revenue-optimal proportion of female
users.
Daily Revenue Per User = b0
þ b1 Share Of Women þ b2 Share Of Women Squared þ    þe ð3Þ
d Daily Revenue Per User
d Share Of Women
¼ 346:8351þ2  ð479:6163Þ  Share Of Women = 0
ð4Þ
ðOptimal) Share Of Women = 346:83512  479:6163¼ 36:2 %: ð5Þ
Similar to the previous approach, the logit regression model in Table 12 aims
to assess the proportion of women yielding the highest share of paying users. In
both analyses, we find similar results: a share of women of 34.6 % leads to the
highest share of premium subscribers, while 36.2 % maximizes the intermedi-
ary’s revenue. Below this optimum, additional female users contribute higher
utility to the overall network (through positive network effects) than men,
leading to either more subscribers or additional revenue. When the optimum is
surpassed, adding more men to the platform will be more valuable than adding
more women.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the share of female users and its
correlation to the expected total revenue. Like in our numerical example, the curve
has an inverted U-shape. As shown previously in Table 3, the proportion of women
fluctuated between 35.5 and 41.1 % over the course of our 915-day observation
period. However, our results show that, given a constant number of users, the
intermediary’s total daily revenue will be approximately 2 % higher with a
women’s share of 36.2 % compared to the historical maximum of 41.1 %, and a full
17.2 % higher compared to a 50/50 split. Our results display that the intermediary in
our study should abandon its previous goal of reaching a 50/50 user split.
5 Discussion
5.1 Research contributions
Our study investigates users’ spending behavior on an online dating platform.
Despite progress in gender equality, findings from more than 60 years ago (Kinsey
et al. 1948) still seem to apply. Asymmetric societal norms still exist in people’s
mate searching behavior that prevent women from making the first move (Bapna
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et al. 2012; Fisman et al. 2006; Piskorski 2012). This aspect certainly accounts for
the results of our study, where we could see men are more likely willing to pay for
online dating services assuming a sufficient installed user base of women than vice
versa.
Our study identifies the existence and the magnitude of the various network
effects in this market. Estimating a SURE model reveals positive CNEs in both
directions: having more female users increases the average revenue per male user
and the total revenue generated by men, and vice versa. A larger choice set of
potential partners increases the chance of a free user finding someone he/she is
Table 12 Results from logit regression analysis (dependent variable: IsPayer)
Independent variables Dependent variable: IsPayer
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
User split
ShareOfWomen 168.1591*** 198.7777*** 219.8497***




















Constant -33.53169*** -40.6881*** -44.57342***
Number of observations 1005,275 1005,275 1005,275
Pseudo R2 0.0021 0.0172 0.0175
Optimum (highest share of payers dep. on share
of women)
36.1 % 34.8 % 34.6 %
* Significant at the 10 % level
** Significant at the 5 % level
*** Significant at the 1 % level
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interested in and eventually subscribing to a premium package that allows him/her
to send messages to other platform users.
Furthermore, we find negative SNEs for both men and women. Increasing the
number of women reduces the revenue per woman, leads to a higher churn of female
users, and reduces the total revenue generated from the installed base of women.
Increasing the number of men reduces the revenue per man and leads to a higher
churn of male users while there is no significant negative impact on total revenue. In
the given freemium model, free users might be deterred from purchasing the
premium package if there are too many people competing for a given number of
users of the opposite gender. Existing premium users who send messages to
potential partners may receive fewer answers if there is too much competition, and
become frustrated. As a consequence, the share of customers who renew their
subscription may decrease and the number of users leaving the platform may
increase.
In addition, we observe that the positive CNEs that women exert are stronger
than the SNEs on the women’s side. As long as the number of male users clearly
exceeds female ones, more women always mean extra revenue. For men, we could
not find statistical support in this case. As a combination of positive CNEs and
substantial negative SNEs, the total revenue impact of solely increasing the number
of male users is not significant.
5.2 Practical contributions
We have shown that operators of two-sided markets who aim to optimize their
revenue can use information on network effects to acquire, manage and monetize
their user base more effectively. We present an approach that determines the
optimal split between the two user groups in terms of revenue and the number of
premium subscribers. We find a positive linear and a negative quadratic influence of
the proportion of women on revenue and number of subscribers. Thus, the utility of
incremental women (who are the user group that exert the strongest CNEs) for the
entire network follows an inverted U-shape. This is in line with the work by Bapna
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Fig. 2 Revenue-optimal share of women
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strength of influence decreases with a user’s number of friends. Our model can be
easily extended, for example to other regional markets, or to any other two-sided
platform with network effects.
We find that a female proportion of the user base of 34.6 % leads to the highest
share of premium subscribers, while the revenue-optimal proportion of women was
36.2 %. As the platform’s share of female users was at circa 40 % and therefore
above the revenue optimum at the end of our observation timeframe, acquiring more
male users promised higher future revenue at that time. Our findings are in conflict
with the intermediary’s initial strategy to achieve a 50/50 user split between women
and men. Our results indicate that the optimal user split generates 17.2 % more
revenue with the same number of users than the targeted, intuitive 50/50 split.
The company that provided us with the data used the results from our analysis to
develop a decision support system that assesses the expected customer lifetime
value of an additional male or female user. The system is continuously collecting
information to provide an updated assessment of the revenue-optimal share of
women at any time. This allows the company to identify those users who promise
the highest incremental value for the platform and to adapt its customer acquisition
strategy accordingly. Based on our static results from the end of our observation
timeframe, the network intermediary relocated its marketing budgets to acquire
more male users; it adapted the costs per install (CPI) for new users according to the
CLV projection for new users and launched a marketing campaign that primarily
targeted male singles.
5.3 Limitations
The limitations of our study offer several avenues for interesting future research.
First, there are other possible ways to measure the influence of network effects on
revenue. Besides the employed SURE, OLS and logit regression models, a random-
effects or fixed-effects panel data model would also be appropriate. Alternatively, a
hazard model could be used to better understand the dynamics of the development.
In our work, we employed a linear—and for the optimization problem additionally a
quadratic—specification of network effects. Apart from these forms, logarithmic
and polynomial relationships (or combined functions; Asvanund et al. 2004)
between the installed user base and dependent economic variables are also possible.
Second, unobserved causes may exist that could bias the estimates of network
effects (Liu et al. 2007). It is hard to imagine that omitted variables could easily reverse
the assessed direction of the network effects. However, the estimated coefficients may
still be biased in terms of their magnitude (Kraemer et al. 2012). We tried to employ
instrumental variables but failed to identify valid orthogonal variables. This would
have certainly helped us to build additional confidence in our results.
Third, the observed network effects are likely to strongly depend on the
underlying price model. In our study, we observe that additional female users
increase male users’ willingness to pay more strongly than vice versa. Depending on
the magnitude of the (asymmetric) CNEs, several researchers suggest increasing the
price difference between the two user groups on a two-sided market (e.g., Strauss
1999) or to charge only one user group and give away the service to the other under
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certain conditions (e.g., Armstrong 2006; Bakos and Katsamakas 2008; Caillaud and
Jullien 2003)—a possible (but in practice hardly used) strategy for dating platforms
that might yield a different revenue-optimal user split. Jullien (2005) provides a list
of possible price models for intermediaries in two-sided markets. Empirical testing of
the impacts of a price model change (e.g., moving from a subscription-based to a
transaction-based pricing model) upon the revenue-optimal user split would be a
worthwhile supplement to the examination carried out in our study.
Lastly, not only price model changes but also price level changes may alter the
network effects and thereby the revenue-optimal proportion of women in the user
base of such a platform. In our case, the intermediary kept prices fixed during the
entire observation period; however, a price change may result in a new optimal user
split, depending on each user group’s respective price sensitivity.
6 Summary and conclusion
This study’s objectives were to empirically assess the influence of CNEs and SNEs
on revenue in a two-sided online network and to derive the revenue-optimal split
between the two user groups, men and women. Therefore, we investigated a leading
online dating platform’s user activity and payment data over a period of two and a
half years. Our sample covered 8923 users in one city who spent approximately
€90,000 by subscribing to one of the premium packages offered by the platform
provider.
In general, men are more willing to pay for dating services than women (if the
installed base of women is sufficiently large). In addition, we observed that both
user groups (i.e., male and female users) exert positive CNEs with regard to revenue
and user enrollment of the other group; however, the positive CNEs women exert on
revenue generation per man are stronger than vice versa. Moreover, we identified
negative SNEs which lead to lower revenue per user and an increased churn rate on
a market side, when that side exclusively grows.
Operators of two-sided markets can use information regarding asymmetric
network effects such as these to acquire, manage, and monetize their user base more
effectively. For the online dating platform in our study, we calculated the revenue-
optimal user split and found that a female proportion of the user base of 36.2 %
yielded 17.2 % more revenue than a 50/50 split for the same total number of users.
Our model is transferrable not only to other online dating platforms, but to all kinds
of two-sided markets with network effects. Platform intermediaries can use the
results from this optimization problem to develop more efficient user acquisition
and monetization strategies.
7 Executive summary
In two-sided markets such as the online dating industry in question, two different user
groups interact and generate various network effects, which can be either positive or
negative. Users may derive positive cross-side network effects from the participation
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of the other user group; for example, the more women are on a dating platform, the
more attractive the service is for men. In addition, same-side network effects can
(usually negatively) impact the utility of the platform for the group’s users if the size
of that group becomes too large. Capitalizing on positive network effects and
mitigating negative ones is an important challenge for providers of two-sided
platforms. In our work, we analyze activity and payment information for over 8900
online dating users over a two-and-a-half-year period. We show that positive cross-
side and negative same-side network effects have a significant impact on the revenue
generated per user. We use these results to determine the revenue-optimal ratio of
women to men on the platform. There is a natural inclination to think that an equal
number of men and women (i.e., a 50/50 split) yields the best user experience and thus
the highest revenue per user for the platform intermediary. However, our analysis
shows that the revenue-optimal proportion of female users on the platform is a mere
36.2%, mainly because (a) men have a higher basic willingness to pay for the service
than women, and (b) women exert stronger positive cross-side network effects on the
on-platform spending habits of men than vice versa. The identified optimum yields
17.2% higher revenue than the 50/50 split the platform provider initially aimed for.
Academics and practitioners can use our framework to quantify network effects,
determine the revenue-optimal ratio of users in any two-sided market, and develop
more effective customer acquisition and monetization strategies.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
Ackerberg, Daniel A., and Gautam Gowrisankaran. 2006. Quantifying equilibrium network externalities
in the ACH banking industry. RAND Journal of Economics 37(3): 738–761.
AppAnnie. 2015. iOS Top App Charts 4 January 2015, http://www.appannie.com/apps/ios/top/?device=
i-phone. Accessed 05 Jan 2015.
Armstrong, Mark. 2006. Competition in two-sided markets. RAND Journal of Economics 37(3): 668–691.
Asvanund, Atip, Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan, and Michael D. Smith. 2004. An empirical analysis of
network externalities in peer-to-peer music-sharing networks. Information Systems Research 15(2):
155–174.
Bakos, J.Yannis, and Evangelis Katsamakas. 2008. Design and ownership of two-sided networks:
implications for Internet platforms. Journal of Management Information Systems 25(2): 171–202.
Bapna, Ravi, Jui Ramaprasad, Galit Shmueli, and Akhmed Umyarov (2012): One-way mirrors and weak-
signaling in online dating: a randomized field experiment. https://www.business.utah.edu/sites/
default/files/media/ravi_bapna_0.pdf. Accessed 09 Jun 2015.
Bapna, Ravi, and Akhmed Umyarov. 2012. Do your online friends make you pay? A randomized field
experiment in an online music social network, NBER Working Paper Series 2012. http://www.heinz.
cmu.edu/download.aspx?id=3660. Accessed 09 Jun 2015.
Berger, Sven C., and Fabian Gleisner. 2009. Emergence of financial intermediaries in electronic markets:
the Case of Online P2P Lending. BuR Business Research 2(1): 39–65.
Borgatti, Stephen B., Ajay Mehra, Daniel J. Brass, and Giuseppe Labianca. 2009. Network analysis in the
social sciences. Science 323: 892–895.
Borle, Sharad, Siddharth S. Singh, and Dipak C. Jain. 2008. Customer lifetime value measurement.
Management Science 54(1): 100–112.
168 Business Research (2015) 8:139–170
123
Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Chris F. Kemerer. 1996. Network externalities in microcomputer software: an
econometric analysis of the spreadsheet market. Management Science 42(12): 1627–1647.
Caillaud, Bernard, and Bruno Jullien. 2003. Chicken and egg: competition among intermediation service
providers. RAND Journal of Economics 34(2): 309–328.
Chacko, Mani, and Will Mitchell. 1998. Growth incentives to invest in a network externality
environment. Industrial and Corporate Change 7(4): 731–744.
Chao, Yong, and Timothy Derdenger. 2013. Mixed bundling in two-sided markets in the presence of
installed base effects. Management Science 59(8): 1904–1926.
Chen, Yuxin, Chakrawarthi Narasimhan, and Z. John Zhang. 2001. Individual marketing with imperfect
targetability. Marketing Science 20(1): 23–41.
Chen, Yuxin, and Jinhong Xie. 2007. Cross-market network effect with asymmetric customer loyalty:
implications for competitive advantage. Marketing Science 26(1): 52–66.
Chu, Junhong, and Puneet Manchanda. 2013. Quantifying cross-network effects in online consumer-to-
consumer platforms, working paper, University of Michigan.
Clements, Matthew T., and Hiroshi Ohashi. 2005. Indirect network effects and the product cycle: video
games in the US, 1994–2002. The Journal of Industrial Economics 53(4): 515–542.
Dai, Qizhi, and Robert J. Kauffman. 2006. To be or not to B2B: evaluating managerial choices for
e-procurement channel adoption. Information Technology Management 7(2): 109–130.
Eisenmann, Thomas R., Geoffrey Parker, and Marshall W. Van Alstyne. 2006. Strategies for two-sided
networks. Harvard Business Review 84(10): 92–101.
Ellison, Glenn, and Sara Fisher Ellison. 2005. Lessons about Markets from the Internet. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 19(2): 139–158.
Farrell, Joseph, and Garth Saloner. 1985. Standardization, compatibility, and innovation. RAND Journal
of Economics 16(1): 70–83.
Fisman, Raymond, Sheena S. Iyengar, Emir Kamenica, and Itamar Simonson. 2006. Gender differences
in mate selection: evidence from a speed dating experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics
121(2): 673–697.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 2000. Pricing a network good to deter entry. Journal of Industrial
Economics 48(4): 373–390.
Gandal, Neil, Michael Kende, and Rafael Rob. 2000. The dynamics of technological adoption in
hardware/software systems: the case of compact disc players. RAND Journal of Economics 31(1):
43–61.
Gehrig, Thomas. 1998. Competing markets. European Economic Review 42(2): 277–310.
Gupta, Sunil, Carl F. Mela, and Jose M. Vidal-Sanz. 2009. The value of a ‘‘free’’ customer. https://faculty.
fuqua.duke.edu/*mela/bio/papers/Gupta_Mela_Vidal-Sanz_2009.pdf. Accessed 09 Jun 2015.
Gutek, Barbara A., Aaron Groff Cohen, and Alison M. Konrad. 1990. Predicting social-sexual behavior at
work: a contact hypothesis. Academy of Management Journal 33(3): 560–577.
Hendel, Igal, Aviv Nevo, and Franc¸ois Ortalo-Magne. 2007. The relative performance of real estate
marketing platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com. American Economic Review 99(5):
1878–1898.
Huber, Peter J. 1967. The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under nonstandard conditions. In:
Proceedings of the fifth Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability, Berkeley,
221–233.
Jullien, Bruno. 2005. Two-sided markets and electronic intermediaries. CESifo Economic Studies
51(2–3): 233–260.
Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro. 1985. Network externalities, competition, and compatibility.
American Economic Review 75(3): 424–440.
Kinsey, Alfred C., Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin. 1948. Sexual behavior in the human male.
Philadelphia: Saunders.
Kraemer, Tim, Oliver Hinz, and Bernd Skiera. 2012. Measuring the economic success of marketing
investments in two-sided markets. In: Proceedings of the 34th INFORMS Marketing Science
Conference, Boston.
Liebowitz, S.J., and Stephen E. Margolis. 1994. Network externality: an uncommon tragedy. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 8(2): 133–150.
Li, Shengli, Yipeng Liu, and Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay. 2010. Network effects in online two-sided
market platforms: a research note. Decision Support Systems 49(2): 245–249.
Liu, Qing, Thomas Otter, and Greg M. Allenby. 2007. Investigating endogeneity bias in marketing.
Marketing Science 26(5): 642–650.
Business Research (2015) 8:139–170 169
123
Malthouse, Edward C., and Robert C. Blattberg. 2005. Can we predict customer lifetime value? Journal
of Interactive Marketing 19(1): 2–16.
Mantrala, Murali K., Prasad A. Naik, Shrihari Sridhar, and Esther Thorson. 2007. Uphill or downhill?
Locating the firm on a profit function, Journal of Marketing 71(2): 26–44.
McIntyre, David P., and Mohan Subramaniam. 2009. Strategy in network industries: a review and
research agenda. Journal of Management 35(6): 1494–1517.
Nair, Harikesh, Pradeep Chintagunta, and Jean-Pierre Dube´. 2004. Empirical analysis of indirect network
effects in the market for personal digital assistants. Quantitative Marketing and Economics 2(1):
23–58.
Nitzan, Irit, and Barak Libai. 2011. Social effects on customer retention. Journal of Marketing 75(6):
24–38.
Pang, Min-Seok, and Hila Etzion. 2012. Analyzing pricing strategies for online services with network
effects. Information Systems Research 23(4): 1364–1377.
Parker, Geoffrey G., and Marshall W. Van Alstyne. 2005. Two-sided network effects: a theory of
information product design. Management Science 51(10): 1494–1504.
Pavlou, Paul A. 2002. Institution-based trust in interorganizational exchange relationships: the role of
online B2B marketplaces on trust formation. Journal of Strategic Information Systems 11(3–4):
215–243.
Piskorski, Mikdaj Jan. 2012. Social failures and social solutions: evidence from OkCupid. http://sie-pr.
stanford.edu/system/files/shared/Piskorski-SIEPR.pdf. Accessed 09 Jun 2015.
Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. 2003. Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the
European Economic Association 1(4): 990–1029.
Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. 2006. Two-sided markets: a progress report. RAND Journal of
Economics 37(3): 645–667.
Rysman, Marc. 2004. Competition between networks: a study of the market for yellow pages. Review of
Economic Studies 71(2): 483–512.
Rysman, Marc. 2007. An empirical analysis of payment card usage. Journal of Industrial Economics
55(1): 1–36.
Rysman, Marc. 2009. The economics of two-sided markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(3):
125–143.
Seamans, Robert, and Feng Zhu. 2013. Responses to entry in multi-sided markets: the impact of Craigslist
on local newspapers. Management Science 60(2): 476–493.
Shankar, Venkatesh, and Barry L. Bayus. 2003. Network effects and competition: an empirical analysis of
the home video game industry. Strategic Management Journal 24(4): 375–384.
Sridhar, Shrihari, Murali K. Mantrala, Prasad A. Naik, and Esther Thorson. 2011. Dynamic marketing
budgeting for platform firms: theory, evidence, and application. Journal of Marketing Research
48(6): 929–943.
Stock, James H., and Motohiro Yogo. 2005. Testing for weak Instruments in linear IV regression. In
David W.K. Andrews and James H. Stock (eds.): identification and inference for econometric
models: essays in honor of Thomas Rothenberg, 80–108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strauss, Steven. 1999. Marketing strategies for products with cross-market network externalities, ISBM
Report 14-2000, Yale School of Management.
Tucker, Catherine, and Juanjuan Zhang. 2010. Growing two-sided networks by advertising the user base:
a field experiment. Marketing Science 29(5): 805–814.
Villanueva, Julian, Shijin Yoo, and Dominique M. Hanssens. 2008. The impact of marketing-induced
versus word-of-mouth customer acquisition on customer equity growth. Journal of Marketing
Research 45(1): 48–59.
Wang, Eric T.G., and Abraham Seidmann. 1995. Electronic data interchange: competitive externalities
and strategic implementation policies. Management Science 41(3): 401–418.
White, Halbert. 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for
heteroskedasticity, Econometrica. Journal of the Econometric Society 48(4): 817–838.
Wilbur, Kenneth C. 2008. A two-sided, empirical model of television advertising and viewing markets.
Marketing Science 27(3): 356–378.
Yoo, Byungjoon, Vidyanand Choudhary, and Tridas Mukhopadhyay. 2002. A model of neutral B2B
intermediaries. Journal of Management Information Systems 19(3): 43–68.
Yoo, Byungjoon, Vidyanand Choudhary, and Tridas Mukhopadhyay. 2007. Electronic B2B marketplaces
with different ownership structures. Management Science 53(6): 952–961.
170 Business Research (2015) 8:139–170
123
